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Donald Trump’s “liberation day” tariff onslaught is fast approaching, all over again. The president’s “reciprocal” tariffs, which were paused in April after markets reacted negatively, are supposed to come into force on August 1 for countries that fail to strike trade deals with Washington. As it stands, that is the case for the vast majority of America’s trade partners — chief among them the EU, the biggest partner of all.
美国总统唐纳德•特朗普(Donald Trump)的“解放日”关税冲击再次迅速逼近。特朗普的“对等”关税因市场反应不佳于4月暂停后，预计将于8月1日对未能与华盛顿达成贸易协议的国家生效。目前，美国绝大多数贸易伙伴都未能达成协议，其中最主要的是欧盟——美国最大的贸易伙伴。
The August 1 deadline will test the complacency that has prevailed in financial markets since Trump’s partial retreat in April, which still left in place a baseline tariff of 10 per cent plus higher levies on cars and steel. It is also a moment of truth for the EU, which must decide quickly how hard it is prepared to hit back if talks fail. Trump is in no hurry to cut a deal with a trading bloc he seems to despise. Earlier this month, when officials on both sides of the Atlantic could discern a landing zone for agreement, the president upped the ante, raising the threatened reciprocal tariff from 20 to 30 per cent. And, as the FT reported last week, just as European negotiators resigned themselves to his 10 per cent baseline tariff, Trump demanded 15 or 20 per cent.
8月1日的最后期限将考验自特朗普4月部分让步以来金融市场普遍存在的自满情绪。尽管特朗普有所退让，但该政策仍保留了10%的基准关税，并对汽车和钢铁征收更高的关税。这对欧盟来说也是关键时刻，欧盟必须迅速决定，如果谈判失败，准备以多大的力度反击。特朗普并不急于与这个他似乎鄙视的贸易集团达成协议。本月早些时候，大西洋两岸的官员都认为有望达成协议时，特朗普忽然加码，将威胁的对等关税从20%提高到30%。而且，正如英国《金融时报》上周报道，就在欧洲谈判代表接受10%的基准关税时，特朗普又要求提到至15%或20%。
The EU has struggled to present a consistent strategy. The European Commission initially stood firm against the 10 per cent baseline. But after the UK secured an agreement, Germany and other member states wobbled and pushed for a similar deal. With Trump now playing hardball, Berlin appears to favour a tougher stance.
欧盟一直在努力提出一致战略。欧盟委员会最初坚决反对10%的基准关税。但在英国达成协议后，德国和其他成员国有所动摇，推动达成类似协议。随着特朗普现在采取强硬立场，柏林似乎倾向于采取更强硬的立场。
The EU’s biggest error has been to think it could negotiate a conventional, mutually beneficial trade arrangement, even one that left US tariffs higher than those in the EU. The UK swallowed Trump’s 10 per cent baseline even though it has a goods trade deficit with the US. With its huge surplus, the EU was never going to win a deal on similar terms. Yet the commission itself has been reluctant to talk up resistance.
欧盟最大的错误是认为它可以谈判达成一项传统的互利贸易安排，即使是一项让美国关税高于欧盟关税的安排。尽管英国对美国存在商品贸易逆差，但它还是接受了特朗普10%的基准关税。由于其巨额顺差，欧盟永远不会在类似条件下赢得协议。然而，委员会本身一直不愿积极表达反对立场。
The commission has lined up some €93bn in retaliatory tariffs. It now needs to show it is willing to open up its extensive armoury of non-tariff instruments, showing the full range of weapons at its disposal. The EU’s new Anti-Coercion Instrument, for example, gives Brussels multiple options for hitting back. It could start with targeted measures that minimise pain to Europe, such as excluding US companies from public procurement, suspending equivalent regulatory treatment of US financial firms or taxing advertising revenues of US tech giants. It should also threaten to go much further if needed. These actions will help build constituencies in America that see the cost of Trump’s trade folly, just as the retaliatory threats of Canada and Mexico have done.
欧盟委员会已准备了约930亿欧元的报复性关税。它现在需要表明，它愿意开放其广泛的非关税工具库，展示其可支配的全部武器。例如，欧盟新的《反胁迫工具》(Anti-Coercion Instrument)为布鲁塞尔提供了多种反击选择。它可以从有针对性的措施开始，尽量减少对欧洲的痛苦，例如将美国公司排除在公共采购之外，暂停对美国金融公司的同等监管待遇，或对美国科技巨头的广告收入征税。如果需要，它还应该威胁采取更进一步的措施。这些行动将有助于在美国内部形成利益相关群体，让他们看到特朗普愚蠢贸易的代价，就像加拿大和墨西哥的报复性威胁一样。
Trump will surely retaliate. But his escalatory dominance is not what it was. His threatened 30 per cent tariffs would pretty much freeze trade, so going to 50 or 100 per cent carries less menace. More serious is the risk that he takes revenge by reneging on commitments to European security or to Ukraine. But an accord on Nato spending increases is in the bag while Trump’s recent rapprochement with Ukraine is driven by Russia’s snubbing of his peacemaking efforts, not generosity to Kyiv.
特朗普肯定会报复。但他在升级对抗方面的主导力已不如以往。他威胁要征收30%的关税，这几乎会冻结贸易，因此，即使把关税提高到50%或100%，威胁也有限。更严重的是，他有可能通过违背对欧洲安全或乌克兰的承诺进行报复。但一项关于北约支出增加的协议已经达成，而特朗普最近与乌克兰的和解是因为俄罗斯无视了他调解和平的努力，并非出于对基辅的慷慨。
The EU’s biggest problem is corralling its member states behind an agreed course of action. Italy and some eastern flank countries remain reluctant to confront Trump. Having showed patience with them, the commission can now argue that good-faith negotiations with Washington have run their course. If the EU does not roll out its big guns now, they might as well not exist. Given Trump’s fickleness, the EU will need its trade weapons even if it somehow reaches an eleventh hour deal.
欧盟最大的问题是如何让成员国在商定的行动方案上步调一致。意大利和一些东翼国家仍然不愿与特朗普对抗。欧盟委员会此前对它们表现出了耐心，现在可以主张，与华盛顿的善意谈判已经走到了尽头。如果欧盟现在不亮出自己的大杀器，那这些武器就等于不存在。鉴于特朗普的反复无常，即使欧盟最终在最后关头达成协议，也仍然需要保留自己的贸易武器。